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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

OF
GOLDw~N

W. CLUFF, SR., aka

G. W. CLl:FF,

Deceased.

Case No. 15559

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a probate proceeding.

After granting final

discharge to the administratrix, the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for the County of Millard, State of Utah, reopened
the estate and appointed the petitioner administratrix against
her will.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court

dP~ied

the petitioner's motion to

set aside the Order appointing her the administratrix against
her will.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Court declare that Judge
J.

Harlan Burns of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Millard
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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County, State of Utah, does not have the power to force Aleith
Cluff to be administratrix of the Estate of Goldwyn

w.

Cluff,

Sr., deceased, because said order would be contrary to the
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIII, Section l,

and the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, Section 21.i

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner was appointed administratrix in the above
entitled matter and continued to administer the estate up to
the 15th day of January, 197 5, when the court entered a decree
of final distribution, approved her first and final account,
and discharged her as the administratrix.

Said decree is

attached to the petition for order granting intermediate appeal
and designated Exhibit B.
On the 19th day of May, 1977, the court made and
entered an order reopening the estate and appointing Cluff
Talbot as administrator De Bonis Non.
act.

Cluff Talbot refused to

On the 31st day of May, 1977, the court made and entered

an order discharging Cluff Talbot as administrator De Banis Non
and ordered that Aleith Cluff continue as administratrix solely
for the purpose of completing Fifth Judicial District Court of
Millard County, Civil No. 6400, Sharlene Wright and Jay Wright,
Plaintiffs, vs. Aleith Cluff, Administratrix of the Estate of
Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., Defendant.
Aleith Cluff has refused to act as administratrix and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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has petitioned the court to set aside said order.
The court has refused to set aside the order but has
stayed 311 proceedings in this matter until Aleith Cluff petitiones
the Court for an order allowing an appeal on this interlocutory
order or decision.
On the 16th day of June, 1977, Ray H. Ivie, attorney
for Aleith Cluff, prepared the motion and order and mailed them
to Judge J. Harlan Burns.

Sai. motion and order is attached to

the petition for order granting intermediate appeal and designated
Exhibit C.
Thereafter Ray H. Ivie checked with the Judge's office
several times and was eventually advised that the motion and
order had apparently been lost in the mail.
On September 19, 1977, Ray H. Ivie prepared the motion
and order again and mailed them to Judge J. Harlan Burns.

Said

motion and order is attached to the petition for order granting
intermediate appeal and designated Exhibit D.
Thereafter, on November 26, 1977, Ray H. Ivie received
a copy of the signed order, a copy of which is attached to the
petition for order granting intermediate appeal and designated
Exhihit E.

Ray H. Ivie thereafter discovered that the order

must have been signed in June, 1977, and left with the County
Clerk.

A

copy of said order is attached to the

petit~on

for order

granting intermediate appeal and designated Exhibit F.
The Clerk has now advised Ray H. Ivie that Judge J.
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Harlan Burns asked him to notify Ray H. Ivie of the signing
and filing of the motion and order.
In the mail of December 5, 1977, Ray H. Ivie receive(
·
a notice, dated November 22, 1977.

1

A copy of the envelope is

attached to the petition for order granting intermediate

app~l

and designated Exhibit G, and a copy of the notice is attached
to the petition for order granting intermediate appeal and
designated Exhibit H.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
COMPELLING THE PETITIONER TO SERVE AS ADMINISTRATRIX
IS A VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITIJTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
INVOLUNTARY SERVITIJDE.
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIII,'
Section 1, provides as follows:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1,
Section 21, provides as follows:
Neither slavery or involuntary servitude, e :cept
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party sh~l 1
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this
State.
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l

The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and ArLicle 1, Section 21, of the Utah State Constitution not
only abolish the institution of slavery, but both provisions
go further and abolish "involuntary servitude".

The essence

of involuntary servitude is that a worker is compelled by law
or force to labor against his will for the benefit of another.
See Hodges v. United States, 203 US l.
No issue of involuntary servitude arises when the
complaining party has been lawfully convicted of a crime and
imprisoned as a result thereof.

Similarly, it has not been

held to be a violation of involuntary servitude to enforce upon
the citizens of this nation the duties they owe to the state.
Involuntary servitude is not imposed upon an individual for
compelling him to serve in the military, Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 US 366, (1918), or for the imposition of a penalty
for the nonpayment of taxes, Weber v. New York 18 Misc 2d 543,
195 NYS 2d 269, (1959).

However, the application of the above

mentioned cases has been limit d to the circumstances of public
duty and responsibility and has never been extended to the area
of private litigation and the imposition by the court of a burden
or responsibility on an individual to affirmatively administer
an estate.

Compelling the petitioner to administer the estate

of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., forces her to work against her will
for the benefit of another.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

-5-
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United States prevents the Court from enforcing involunlary
servitude on any person, including attorneys who have historical:'
been considered officers of the Court.

See United States of Ame:.

v. Lesser, 233 F Supp. 535 (1961) reversed on other grounds 335
F2d. 832 (1964).

Regarding the issue of compelling a member of

the Bar to represent an indigent defendant the court states:
Much has been heard concerning civil rights
these days, but somehow or another people seem to
overlook the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which rea~
as follows:
"Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."
Any statute of California or of the United States
which is contrary to that amendment is void. The
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution which prescribes
that an accused shall "enjoy the right * * * to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense," is just
as much modified by the Thirteenth Amendment as all
other parts of the Constitution which permitted
slavery.
While the Court is mindful of the high duty of
'
every member of the Bar to serve those who are opprwd
it has no more power to compel a member of the Baro-_!
the State of California to do the tremendous amount o:
work and put in the tremendous amount of time it would_
require to conscientiously examine the files and recorc
in this case, and represent the defendants on appeal,
and thus compel involuntary servitude by a lawyer to
convicted criminals, than I have to make an order com·
pelling these defendants, had they not been convicted'.
to pick cotton for a private individual. This lack. 0;
power is implicitly recognized in Section 1915 of.T1t 1'
28 U.S. Code, inasmuch as that Section does notg1ve
the Court the power to appoint, or assign, or com~~
or coerce an attorney to represent anyone, but mere
gives the Court the power to request an attorney to 00
so.

I

The Utah Supreme Court has also made declarations
regarding involuntary servitude.

In McGrew v. Industrial
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85 1'2d 608 (1938), the plaintiffs seek to have the Utah
Minimum Wage Law declared void.

They brought the action to

enjoin the Industrial Commission from enforcing its order
fixitig minimum wages and maximum hours for women and minors
engaged in retail trades.

Speaking with respect to the

property rights held by the plaintiffs the court said:
..... The right to work, the right to engage in
gainful occupations, the right to receive compensation for one's work are essentially property
rights . . . . . . . . . But no man can have a vested interest
in the work or labor of another. He has no right in
law to insist that another must work for him. Such
right would amount to involuntary servitude or slavery
and be in violation of Section 21 of Article l of the
State Constitution. Labor is not a mere commodity to
be bought and sold upon the market but is part of the
warp and woof of the life of the laborer. The employer
is entitled to have to own, and use the result of the
effort, energy and t0il of his employee. That right
is his property. But the activity exerted, the energy
used, the strength expended and the skill applied
belong to the workman. They are part of his body,
part of his life and can neither be bought nor sold.
One's body and life are his own and he cannot be
required to yield up either except at his own desire,
the call of his country, or the decree of his God.
In and to those things no one else can acquire any
rights whatsoever.
In 1968 the Utah Supreme Court made two significant
statements with respect to the rights of lawyers as they were
called upon to serve or represent indigent clients.

In Washington

County v. Day, 447 P2d 189, 22 Utah 2d 6, (1968), the appellant
petitioned the Supreme Court of Utah to prohibit the enforcement
of an order granting the defendant's request for an investigator
at county expense.

Speaking of the court's inherent power to

prevent the miscarriage of justice and to watch over the rights
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of the impecunious defendant the court said:
However, it must not be understood that lawyers
alone among all the professions can be compelled
by the legislative authority to undertake free
.
services for impecunious people. The lawyer has
j
the same rights as the doctor, the public accountant '
or the surveyor. None of them can be compelled by 'I
the law to render services for free.
In Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P2d 193, 22 Utah 2d 12,
p. 194-195, the Supreme Court was again called on to decide
fate of lawyers when rendering services to indigent clients.
Although the court held that a lawyer should represent the
client and accept his assignment from the court as a part of
his professional responsibility, the holding was clear in statir.'
that the reason the lawyer would serve an indigent client for
free is due to his relationship with the court and that the
leg is la tu re could no more req· ire a lawyer to represent a
client free than it could compel a physician to treat a sick
or injured indigent patient without pay.
For the legislature to attempt to compel a lawyer
to work by passing a statute requiring the judge
to order it done would be to take his property
without giving just compensation, or to impose a
form of involuntary servitude upon him.
Forcing the petitioner in the present case to serve
as administratrix against her will is a clear violation of her
constitutional right to be free from involuntary servitude.
The District Court had no power to gain jurisdiction over t~
petitioner and require that she affirmatively take actions as
administratrix, to do so would force her to serve against her

-8-
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will for the benefit of another.

POINT II
THE POWER OF THE PROBATE COURTS TO APPOINT ADMINISTRATORS IS A POWER CONFERRED BY STATUTE AND BY NO OTHER
METHOD.
Consent is an essential requirement to the appointment
of an it1dividual as an administrator of an estate.

Accord~

'g

to the laws of Utah and the statutory grant of authority given
the probate court, a judge can only issue letters of administration
after the appointee takes and subscribes to an oath that he will
perform occording to the laws and duties of an administrator.
Section 75-5-1 U.C.A. 1953. This statute was applicable to the
facts of this case because the order appointing Aleith Cluff
administratrix was entered on May 31, 1977, a month prior to
the effective date of the new Utah probate code.

Incidentally,

under the new probate code, the administrator must still file
an answer with the court consenting to the appointment.

Utah

Uniform Probate Code 75-3-601, 75-3-602 (1977).
Section 75-5-1 U.C.A. 1953 states:
Before letters testamentary or of administration or
of guardianship are issued the executor, administrator
or guardian must take and subscribe an oath that he
will perform according to law the duties of executor,
administrator or gua~dian, which oath must be attached
to the letters. All letters testamentary, of administration and of guardianship issued to, and all bonds
executed by, executors, administrators or guardians,
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with the affidavits and certificates thereon, must be
forthwith recorded by the clerk of the court having
jurisdiction of the estate, in books to be kept by
him in his office for that purpose.
Section 75-12-19 U.C.A.

i

(1953) states:

When the estate has been fully administered, and it
is shown by the executor or administrator, by the
production of satisfactory vouchers, that he has
paid all sums of money due from him, and delivered
under the order of the court all the property of the
estate to the parties entitled, and performed all the
acts lawfully required of him, the court must make a
judgment or decree discharging him from all liability
to be incurred thereafter.
On January 15, 1975, Aleith Cluff was discharged as
administratrix of the estate of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr., in the
same proceeding the judge entered a decree of final
and approved her first and final account.

distribut~n

According to Sectioo

75-12-19 U .C.A. (1953), the administratrix or personal represent·
ative is discharged from all liability to be incurred after final!
discharge.

Consequently, when the Honorable J. Harlan Burns

entered the order appointing petitioner as administratrix on May
31, 1977, such action constituted a reopening of the estate and
the appointment of the petitioner as administratrix would be vat::
and binding only by satisfying the statutory requirement of conse:
by the appointee and the taking of an oath as required by Section!
75-5-1 U.C.A.

(1953).

Petitioner never consented to the appo~t·

ment as administratrix and has never taken the oath as required
by the above mentioned Code section, as a result, the court is
without jurisdiction and has no power to appoint the petitioner
administratrix without complying with the statutory grant of
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authority.

Sec Wink v. Marshall, 392 P2d 768, (Oregon 1964).

POINT III
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR CONSENT
TO HIS APPOINTMENT BEFORE LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BE ISSUED
AND

AUTHORITY TO BIND THE ESTATE BECOMES EFFECTIVE.
The administration of estates is a very sensative and

delicate area of civil litigation.

Administrators serve as

fiduciaries and as such owe a strict duty of care and honesty
to all those involved in the probate of an estate.

To compel

an individual to serve as an administrator against his will and
for the Denefit of those to whom he has no obligation would be a
flagrant violation of public policy.

For the protection of heirs,

creditors and the public in general, an administrator should not
be forced to serve but should be allowed to serve only after consenting to requirements of the office and taking an oath swearing
to perform in accordance with the rules governing estate administration.
In the case at bar, Aleith Cluff was appointed administratrix against her will and without taking an oath to adhere
tu the rules of administration, to compel her to serve the estate
of Goldwyn

w.

Cluff, Sr., would be in direct conflict with the

clearly established public

pol·~y

of requiring administrators to

assume and function in a fiduciary relationship with all those

-11-
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concerned in the estate.

CONCLUSION
Forcing Aleith Cluff to serve as administratrix
against her will violates her constitutional right to be free
from involuntary servitude, circumvents the statutory authoritJ
granted the probate court to appoint administrators only within
the bounds of legislative authority and violates the logic of
public policy demanding a fiduciary obligation imposed on admin·
istrators.
Petitioner contends that the Honorable J. Harlan Burns
was in error in appointing her as administratrix against her will.
Petitioner requests the Supreme Court to set aside the

order~

May 31, 1977, appointing her as the administratrix of the estate

I

G

of Goldwyn W. Cluff, Sr.
Respectfully submitted this

<t..!!3! day

of February, 1978. /

Appellant
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